

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 00530 01 OF 02 201628Z

41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
----- 114330

O P 200328Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9198

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 0530

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UN CY

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION BETWEEN CLERIDES AND AMB SCALI ON

CYPRUS IN SC

SUMMARY: DURING FRANK, CORDIAN TWO HOUR TALK WITH AMB. SCALI, CLERIDES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH DENKTASH UNLESS SC GAVE SOME NEW SIGN OF TRYING TO IMPLEMENT UN RESES ON CYPRUS. HE THOUGHT ONE POSSIBILITY WAS " A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT" DURING WHICH TURKISH SIDE WOULD BEGIN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL, REFUGEE RETURN AND OTHER MAJOR ISSUES. NAOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A SMALL " GOOD OFFICES MISSION" MADE UP OF TWO OR THREE SC MEMBERS, WHICH WOULD ENGAGE ITSELF IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IF HE WERE TO RETURN TO DEADLOCKED NEGOTIATIONS WITH NOTHING FROM SC, TWO THINGS WOULD HAPPEN: A) HE WOULD BE FORCES TO RESIGN SINCE HE WOULD HAVE LOST ALL CREDIBILITY WITH GREEK CYPRIOT PEOPLE, AND B) CURRENT DESPAIR IN HIS COMMUNITY WOULD LEAD TO FATAH-LIKE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY.

(FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES ADDED THAT THIRD CONSEQUENCE OF CONTINUED STALEMATE WOULD BE FREATLY ENHANCED SOV INFLUENCE.) SCALI REPLIED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD CYPRIOT DILEMA, BUT WARNED THAT WE HAD LEARNED FROM HARD EXPERIENCE IN SC THAT TIME LIMITS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 00530 01 OF 02 201628Z

AND EADLINES USUALLY DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. AS FOR GOOD

OFFICES, HE FEARED ANY SUCH MISSION WOULD BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND INEFFECTIVE AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DELAY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES RATHER THAN HELP ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

1. AMB SCALI, WITH AMB SCHAUFELE AND OTHER MISSION OFFICERS, CALLED ON CLERIDES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CYPRUS DELEGATION AT PLAZA LATE AFTERNOON FEB 19. CLERIDES OPENED CONVERSATION WITH REMARK THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS HANDLING OF CYPRUS IN SC "FRANKLY AND BETWEEN FRIENDS," THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH HIS TALKS WITH AMERICANS HAD ALWAYS TAKEN PLACE. HE SAID THAT AS US KNEW, HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF STAUNCHEST SUPPORTERS OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF REACHING A LASTING AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT. AFTER TURKISH INVASION LAST SUMMER, HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BECAUSE SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD AT AN EARLY STAGE SHOWN INTEREST IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE A FAIR SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE TALKS. KISSINGER HAD TRIED TO OBTAIN MEANINGFUL TURKISH CONCESSIONS, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, HIS VISIT TO ANKARA HAD BEEN CANCELLED AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS HAD INTERVENED SO THAT TURKISH GESTURES WERE NEVER FORTHCOMING. MAXIMUM HE WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE WAS BRUSSELS AGREEMENT WHEREBY TURKEY AGREED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE. SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS. EVERY TIME HE, CLERIDES, PROPOSED TO DISCUSS A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DENKTASH WAS NOT READY TO DO SO, AND SAID HE MUST SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. IT HAD BECOME APPARENT TURKEY WAS NOT INTERESTED IN REAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT ONLY IN CONSOLIDATING ITS POSITION ON THE ISLAND.

2. CLERIDES WENT ON TO SAY THAT PROBLEM PRESENTLY FACING CYPRUS GOVT WAS TO DETERMINE "WHAT LEVERS" COULD BE SUED TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FOR PRESENT IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION. PERHAPS ONE WAY OUT MIGHT BE SETTING "A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT" FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF GA RESOLUTION 3212, WITH IT SCALLS FOR TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND RETURN OF REFUGEES. GOC WAS SEARCHING FOR A PRACTICAL WAY TO RETURN TO FREE, MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ASKED US ADVICE AS A FRIEND.

3. SCALI REPLIED THAT HE FULLY RECOGNIZED CLERIDES' GOOD WILL AND DEEPLY REGRETTED PAIN AND ANGUISH THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD ENDURED. HE SAID GUIDING FRAMEWORK OF US POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 00530 01 OF 02 201628Z

WAS OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY, US BELIEVED THAT WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES IT STILL SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A SOLUTION IN WHICH BOTH COMMUNITIES COULD LIVE SIDE BY SIDE. WE SAW NO EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR PRESENT DISCUSSIONS, AND BELIEVED COUNCIL'S BASIC OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO REVIVE AND ENCOURAGE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AS FOR THE "OTHER PROCEDURES," FOR WHICH CLERIDES HAD SAID HIS GOVT WAS SEARCHING, SCALI SAID LESSON WE HAD LEARNED FROM HARD EXPERIENCE IN SC WAS THAT TIME FRAMES AND EADLINES FREQUENTLY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION. MOREOVER, WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE ANY MECHANISM CREATED WHICH MIGHT DIMINISH OUR ABILITY TO EXERT INFLUENCE UPON TURKEY. GRANTED THAT US INFLUENCE HAD SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED FOR THE PRESENT FOLLOWING RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, WE NEVERTHELESS STILL HOPED TO LEAD TURKEY TOWARD A FAIR AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

5. CLERIDES SAID IT WAS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE TO GO BACK TO INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS UNLESS THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT. TURKSIH POSITION WAS BECOMING STEADILY WORSE. TURKS HAD SHOWN A CLEAR-CUT INTENTION TO CHANGE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE ISLAND, MOST RECENT EXAMPLE BEING THE GRANTING OF CYPRIOT CITIZENSHIP TO TURKISH TROOPS STATIONED IN THE NORTH, AND INTITATION TO THEIR FAMILIES TO IMMIGRATE. SOMETHING MORE THAN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WAS NOW NEEDED. CREATING SOME CONTACT GROUP OR COMMITTEE TO ENGAGE ITSELF IN NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT HELP. WECKMANN WAS A CAPABLE MAN, INDEED ALL SYG'S SPECIAL RESPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN, BUT HE SERVED LITTLE PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO OBSERVE AND REPORT TO SYG. EVERY TIME HE PUT FORWARD A TIMID SUGGESTION, TURKS OBJECTED THAT HE WAS EXCEEDING HIS AUTHORITY. WHAT WAS NEEDED THEREFORE WAS A GROUP THAT HAD AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN TO BREAK THE IMPASSE.

6. SCALI SAID BASIC QUESTION WAS WHETHER ANY ACTION BY COUNCIL WOULD ADVANCE OR WORSEN SITUATION. OUR CONCERN WAS THAT CYPRUS GOVT MIGHT, THROUGH DESPAIR AND UNDERSTANDABLE ANGER, FOLLOW PATH THAT COULD FREEZE SITUATION AND ULTIMATELY MAKDE IT WORSE THAT IT IS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 00530 01 OF 02 201628Z

7. CLERIDES SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE FORCE OF SCALI'S ARGUMENT, BUT HAD CONSIDERED MATTER CAREFULLY BEFORE COMING TO SC. PROBLEM WAS THAT SITUATION WAS NOW TOTALLY FORZEN. IN FACT, IT COULD NOT REMAIN UNCHANGED MUCH LONGER WITHOUT GREEK CYPRIOTS ORGANIZING THEMSELVES INTO "A FATAH" OUR OF DESPERATION-- THOUGH THAT WAS THE LAST THING HE WANTED TO HAPPEN.

8. SCALI SAID US CERTAINLY RECOGNIZED THAT THERE MUST BE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IF WE WERE TO AVOID HAVING A FESTERING SORE ON THE ISLAND. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATE QUESTION WAS WHETHER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE DID NOT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WITH TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS.

9. CLERIDES SAID THAT IF NOTHING COMES OUT OF SC AND GREEK

CYPRIOTS SIMPLY GO BACK TO THE TALKS, TURKS WOULD BELIEVE
THEY CAN GET OFF SCOT FREE, AND NOTHING WOULD
STOP THEM FOR CREATING STILL ANOTHER FAIT ACCOMPLI. WOULD
CLERIDES AND DENKTASH THEN BE EXPECTED TO GO ON AND
CONTINUE TO MAKE FOOLS OF THEMSELVES? INDEED, CLERIDES
CONTINUED, ONE OF MAIN PROBLEMS HE FACED WAS PUBLIC OPINION.
HIS CREDIBILITY WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY
IMPAIRED. HE COULD STAND DOWN NOW, BUT IF HE DID SO NOBODY
ELSE COULD TAKE HIS PLACE AND FINISH THE JOB SINCE NO GREEK
CYPRIOT WOULD CONTINUE TO BELIEVE NEGOTIATIONS COULD SUCCEED
IF HE HAD FAILED. THUS, A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO MOVE THE TALKS ALONG
WITHOUT AGITATING TURKEY TOO MUCH. HE WAS NOT, HE SAID, SUGGESTING
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE WIDER CONTEXT ADVOCATED BY SOVIET
UNION, BUT ONLY SOME REASONABLE WAY TO MOVING FORWARD CURRENT
NEGOTIATIONS. SOME KIND OF GOOD OFFICES IN THE TALKS
ON THE PART OF A SMALL NUMBER OF SC MEMBERS HAD SEEMED
ONE WAY OF ATTAINING THIS GOAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 00530 02 OF 02 200435Z

14-11

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W

----- 106069

O P 200328Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9199

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 0530

EXDIS

10. FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES INTERVENED TO SAY HE BELIEVED
A SMALL "GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE" COULD GENUINELY HELP REVIVE
NEGOTIATIONS. ITS MEMBERS MIGHT ENGAGE IN USEFUL SHUTTLE
DIPLOMACY BETWEEN ATHENS, NICOSIA AND ANKARA. CLERIDES
INTERJECTED THAT EC-9 HAD OFFERED THEIR GOOD OFFICES, AND
PERHAPS A MEMBER OF THE NINE SERVING ON COUNCIL

PLUS TWO OR THREE OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS MIGHT FORM SUCH A MISSION.

11. SCALI REMARKED IT SEEMD TO HIM THAT SUCH A COMMITTEE WOULD BE FAR LESS FLEXIBLE AND EFFECTIVE THAN ONE MAN, NAMELY SYG'S REPRESENTATIVE. HE FEARED SUCH A GROUP MIGHT NEEDLESSLY COMPLICATE SITUATION. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE UNHAPPY EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN LAOS AND VIETNAM, WHICH ENDED UP POWERLESS AND DEADLOCKED SINCE EACH SIDE TRIED TO PROMOTE VIEWS OF THE PARTY WITH WHICH IT HAD THE FRIENDLIEST TIES. SCALI DOUBTED SUCH A MISSION WAS REALLY AN ANSWER, OR WHETHER IT WAS NOT A DIVERSION FROM THE IMPORTANT BUSINESS OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

12. SCHAUFELE NOTED THAT SC IN THE PAST HAD SENT FACT-FINDING MISSIONS, THOUGH IT HAD NEVER SET UP A GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE. COUNCIL'S EXPERIENCE WITH FACT-FINDING MISSIONS, HE ADDED, HAD CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 00530 02 OF 02 200435Z

BEEN VERY UNEVEN SINCE THEIR REPORTS WERE FREQUENTLY SUSPECT AS BEING POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. AN EFFECTIVE GOOD OFFICES MISSION WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO SET UP SINCE THE MISSION WOULD HAVE TO REPORT BACK TO SC, WHICH COMPRISSES 15 MEMBERS HOLDING VERY DIFFERENCE VIEWS. MOREOVER, TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS, MISSION WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES-IN ITSELF A GREAT HURDLE. FOR THESE REASONS, SCHAUFELE BELIEVED PROSPECT OF SETTING UP A USEFUL GODD OFFICES MISSION WERE QUESTIONABLE.

13. CHRISTOPHIDES ASKED IF US HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS TO PUT FORWARD ON HOW TO BREAK PRESENT IMPASSE. SCHAUFELE REPLIED THAT A REASONABLE OBJECTIVE WOULD SEEM TO BE TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PUSHING SITUATION TO THE POINT WHERE IT BECAME FROZEN. SCALI COMMENTED THAT WE MUST TRY TO ACCELERATE AND INTENSIFY THE TALKS WITHOUT AT SAME TIME GIVING TURKEY ANY REASON FOR NOT NEGOTIATING. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ONLY PARTIES THEMSELVES CAN REACH AGREEMENT, AND IT IS THEIR EFFORTS, IN CONTEXT OF PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, THAT WE MUST TRY TO REVIVE.

14. COMMENT: COMPARED TO HIS FOUR COLLEAGUES, CLERIDES WAS OBJECTIVE IN VIEWING CURRENT DEADLOCK AND PROSPECTS. ROSSIDES AND PAPADOPOULOS, AND OCCASIONALLY KYPRIANOU, EMOTIONALLY INTERJECTED HARD-LINE COMMENTS WHICH CLERIDES SOUGHT TO DEFLECT. THUS, IT APPEARS THAT COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO CLERIDES SHOULD BE PRIORITY, RECOGNIZING THAT OTHERS ARE LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDERS.

SCALI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975USUNN00530
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750060-1196
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750225/aaaaawxa.tel
Line Count: 275
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <23 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DISCUSSION BETWEEN CLERIDES AND AMB SCALI ON CYPRUS IN SC
TAGS: PFOR, CY, UN, (CLERIDES), (SCALI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006